Cambodia and International Community

Stephen J. Solarz

Spring 1990

Foreign Affairs: www.foreignaffairs.com

The Cambodian endgame has entered a new and critical stage. The regime installed in Phnom Penh by Vietnam eleven years ago-the People's Republic of Kampuchea-continues to hold sway over the major cities and most of the countryside. But with the withdrawal of Vietnamese combat forces in September 1989, its capacity to counter the Khmer Rouge remains in serious doubt, and it is entirely possible that Pol Pot could battle his way back to power in Phnom Penh.1

Continued fighting in Cambodia serves the interests of the Khmer Rouge. Sustained by a mixture of intimidation and indoctrination, as well as Chinese support and Thai sanctuary, the Khmer Rouge is once again a fanatical and formidable force. It has given up neither its goal of regaining power by whatever means necessary nor its xenophobic brand of communism. The best way to prevent the Khmer Rouge from returning to power is to shift the conflict from the battlefield to the ballot box.

Clearly, the best outcome for Cambodia would be a comprehensive political settlement that demilitarized the internal struggle, neutralized Cambodia as an arena for superpower and regional rivalry, and gave the Khmer people an opportunity for free and fair elections. In the last three years there has been a variety of efforts to produce such a settlement. All have failed, however, largely because the formulas put forward have been more unacceptable to the parties concerned than a continuation of the conflict itself.

In the absence of a settlement the most that Cambodia can hope for is to become a kind of Southeast Asian Lebanon, condemned to continuous civil strife and economic deprivation. In a worst-case scenario Cambodia could even witness a resumption of the Killing Fields should Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge return to power.

In response to the diplomatic deadlock and deteriorating military situation, the Australian foreign minister, Gareth Evans, has launched a new initiative designed to end the fighting and give the Cambodian people an opportunity to determine their own destiny. The core of the Australian proposal-that the United Nations assume responsibility for the administration of Cambodia during the interim period between the establishment of a ceasefire and the emergence of a new government following an internationally supervised election-has attracted an unprecedented consensus among the great powers. In view of the difficulties the Cambodians have had in reaching agreement among themselves on almost all issues, the fate of Canberra's initiative will probably be a litmus test for the possibility of any agreement at all. Indeed, it does not seem an exaggeration to suggest that the Australian proposal constitutes the last best hope for a peaceful resolution of the Cambodian conflict. No less certain is the danger the Khmer Rouge poses for Cambodians if negotiations fail.

The chances for a comprehensive political settlement in Cambodia are not high. Yet no one knows whether a mutually acceptable agreement is impossible or merely difficult. In view of the consequences of a continuation of the conflict, it would be a serious political and moral mistake to let the fear of failure preclude the possibility of an overall settlement. Indeed, if the international community neglects the nation's bloody past, defenseless Cambodians may be condemned to repeat it.

II

For the United States, Cambodia is primarily a moral and humanitarian issue. For the countries of Southeast Asia, it is strategically important because of its geographical position as a potential buffer state for both Vietnam and Thailand. Hanoi has traditionally sought to dominate Phnom Penh or at least deny hegemony to Bangkok. Thailand would prefer to keep Cambodia in its sphere of influence or at least out of Vietnam's. Thailand's partners in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore-have all sought to keep Vietnam out of Cambodia, both to support Thailand's strategic objective and to reaffirm the principles of nonintervention and self-determination.2 Cambodia has also been the object of great-power conflicts. Beijing's primary objective has been to have a client in power in Phnom Penh and, failing that, to support resistance to Vietnamese hegemony in Indochina, while Moscow has supported Hanoi as a counterweight to Beijing.

There is, however, a precedent for isolating Cambodia from regional and superpower conflict. Once Cambodia became independent from the French in 1953, its ruler, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, sought to preserve autonomy through a policy of neutrality. For more than a decade he succeeded in steering a course among Thailand, South Vietnam and the United States on the one hand, and North Vietnam and China on the other. With the coming of the Vietnam War, however, superpower involvement in Southeast Asia intensified and the vise constraining Cambodian independence tightened. The prince had to concede the eastern portion of the country as a logistics base to North Vietnam and turn a blind eye to the massive American bombing campaign that followed.

Compounding the difficulty of Sihanouk's effort to preserve his country's stability and independence was the evolution of the Cambodian Communist Party. The movement was originally led by individuals who traced their ancestry to the anti-French struggle of the Viet Minh. Challenging them was a group of nationalistic intellectuals who regarded Hanoi's guidance of their party as a type of colonialism. The latter group, led by Pol Pot (né Saloth Sar), gained preeminence in 1960. Five years later, when Vietnam and China urged the Cambodian Communist Party to cease its challenge to Sihanouk's regime-as the expedient price of Sihanouk's tolerance of the Vietnamese presence in the eastern part of the country-Pol Pot refused. At the same time, these "Khmers Rouges" supplemented their disdain for the norms of proletarian internationalism with an ultra-radical approach to the revolution within, a metastasis of China's Cultural Revolution. Thus were sown the seeds of auto-genocide.

Beset on all sides, the prince was deposed in 1970 by Lon Nol, whose forces in turn proved unable to stave off the victory of the Khmer Rouge in April 1975. Once in power Pol Pot proceeded to depopulate the cities, slaughter the educated, and impose an unrelenting program of forced-draft economic development. When communism did not materialize overnight, the revolution began to devour itself, with some elements of the party escaping to Vietnam. Thousands of cadres were tortured and murdered in Tuol Sleng, a special concentration camp in Phnom Penh for party members. Close to 30 percent of the population died as a result of Khmer Rouge misrule.

In Southeast Asia, nationalism triumphed over ideology after 1975. The Khmer Rouge xenophobia for the Vietnamese and China's rivalry with Vietnam shattered the facade of Asian communist unity. The split deepened between China (which backed the Khmer Rouge) and the Soviet Union (which increasingly favored Vietnam). In late 1978, Vietnam invaded Cambodia to end the latter's challenges to its territorial integrity.3 Hanoi quickly took over most of the country and installed the remnants of the pro-Vietnamese wing of the Cambodian communist movement as the People's Republic of Kampuchea.

Vietnam's victory produced a strategic nightmare for both China and Thailand. Beijing faced powerful "barbarians" to both the north and the south, which it renamed "global and regional hegemonists." Bangkok saw its traditional buffer occupied by its historic adversary. Thailand and China then conspired to redress the balance of power by an act of complete moral cynicism-the resurrection of the nearly devastated Khmer Rouge. Pol Pot's forces became the lever for removing Vietnam from Cambodia, or at least a rein to render it incapable of aggression elsewhere.

The United States and the rest of ASEAN went along, sometimes reluctantly, with this strategy. In order to put the best light on it and to provide a counterweight to the Khmer Rouge, two small political groupings-the Khmer People's National Liberation Front and the National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia, led respectively by former Prime Minister Son Sann and Prince Sihanouk-were joined with the Khmer Rouge in 1982 to form a Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea. The CGDK was imposed on Sihanouk and Son Sann to prevent the United Nations from substituting the PRK for the Khmer Rouge as the occupant of Cambodia's seat in the United Nations or from declaring the seat vacant. From a Leninist perspective this coalition was a classic united front, in which communists used "royalists" and "bourgeois nationalists" to promote their interests.4

In time Cambodia became Vietnam's Vietnam, an obstacle to Vietnam's economic development and a drain on Soviet-supplied resources. As Moscow's interest in regional conflicts waned under Mikhail Gorbachev's leadership, Hanoi resorted to its own version of "Vietnamization." It made commitments-which few believed at the time-to withdraw its forces by 1990, and worked to build up the PRK regime-now led by Hun Sen, a former Khmer Rouge regimental commander-as an economic, political and military bulwark strong enough to withstand a challenge by the Khmer Rouge. At the same time, Vietnam sought a political settlement in which its adversaries would accept the legitimacy of the PRK. Not until the summer of 1988, however, did the international community take seriously the possibility that Vietnamese forces would indeed withdraw from Cambodia and leave the world to face the problem that remained: an armed and revitalized Khmer Rouge.

III

The tortuous process of finding a negotiated settlement to the Cambodian problem has been long and complex, usually conducted under a glare of publicity, marked first by signs of progress but then followed by bitter reversals. A number of different approaches have been tried, but all the formulas required the verified end of foreign engagement in the military struggle in Cambodia: the total withdrawal of Vietnamese troops, the end of Thai sanctuaries for the Khmer Rouge and the noncommunist resistance (NCR), and the end of external support for the Khmer factions. All envisage some type of election as a necessary act of self-determination by the Cambodian people.

The core disagreement concerns the political arrangement that will exist in Cambodia from the time a settlement is concluded until the emergence of a new, electorally legitimate government. On this question, there have been two basic approaches. The first advocates the creation of a quadripartite interim government in which all four factions, including the Khmer Rouge, share power. The second plan argues for the preservation of the current PRK regime, supplemented by mechanisms that provide some role for all four factions. Neither of these approaches has been acceptable to all the parties concerned.

The quadripartite formula was the proposal of Prince Sihanouk in his capacity as president of the CGDK. It is supported by his coalition partners (Son Sann and the Khmer Rouge), by China and the ASEAN countries, and was generally endorsed by the United States. As originally tabled at the Paris conference in August 1989, it envisaged the simultaneous dissolution of the CGDK and the PRK as legal entities, and the sharing of ministerial power on a four-party basis. The Sihanouk proposal included, under U.N. aegis, an international peacekeeping force and international supervision of elections. The four military forces would be either disbanded or reduced to 10,000 fighters each, pending the creation of new Cambodian armed forces.

The basic PRK proposal, which was also presented at the Paris conference by Prime Minister Hun Sen, called for a ceasefire in place and a continuation of the political status quo-the PRK regime-until general elections. A supreme steering council would be established, composed of representatives of the PRK, the CGDK and a number of unaffiliated Khmers. The supreme steering council, under international supervision, would create an electoral system and conduct elections. An international control mechanism would verify the end of external assistance, but there would be no provision for peacekeeping forces. Nor would this control commission be under U.N. aegis since, in Phnom Penh's view, the United Nations had shown itself to be biased by passing resolutions hostile to the PRK and by continuing to seat the CGDK. In the hard-line version of the PRK proposal, the Khmer Rouge military and political organizations would be abolished and their leaders punished. In other versions, Khmer Rouge fighters who laid down their arms would be reincorporated into the political life of the country.

Each of these proposals has been consistently rejected. The CGDK has opposed the standard PRK proposal because it would legitimize a regime imposed on the Cambodian people by force of Vietnamese arms. Moreover, the CGDK argues, the PRK's control of the administrative apparatus would virtually guarantee a victory by Hun Sen in any election, thereby depriving the Cambodian people of the opportunity to freely and fairly determine their own destiny and denying the other factions any chance of gaining power.

On the other hand, the PRK has rejected the CGDK proposal, claiming that its effect would be to legitimize the Khmer Rouge and delegitimize the PRK, whose ideological raison d'être has been unyielding opposition to "the Pol Pot clique." Moreover, the PRK believes that a quadripartite approach would give the Khmer Rouge a better opportunity to come to power than it would have in the absence of a political settlement. Hun Sen has expressed the fear that his party, as only one element of a coalition government, would be outvoted by the other three factions. The Khmer Rouge would therefore be able to subvert the government from within while attacking it from without.

Advocates of a quadripartite approach answer Hun Sen's objections by asserting that the Khmer Rouge does not wish to regain exclusive power in Phnom Penh. As evidence they point to the five pledges of Khmer Rouge representatives at the Paris conference:

-support for Sihanouk's leadership;

-support for disarmament of all the factions;

-support for a strong international peacekeeping force under U.N. auspices;

-conditional support for internationally supervised elections and the promise to abide by the outcome;

-willingness not to insist on equal power-sharing in the quadripartite interim authority.

Some argue that the Khmer Rouge pledges should be put to the test. Pinning one's faith in the quadripartite proposal on such promises is a dangerous and perhaps deadly gamble on the goodwill of a movement for which truth-let alone decency-has been a totally alien concept. Moreover, the U.S. government and most independent observers believe that the objective of the Khmer Rouge is to regain its monopoly of power by whatever means necessary. The continued harsh treatment of civilians in refugee camps by the Khmer Rouge belies any claims of a more humane approach. The claim by the Khmer Rouge that Pol Pot has "retired" when, in fact, he continues to dominate and direct the Khmer Rouge is persuasive evidence of its continued passion for prevarication. Finally, its characterization of the auto-genocide as a "mistake" indicates that all it has learned from the past is the need to employ euphemisms to divert international attention from its barbarous record.

IV

Inhibiting the search for a negotiated settlement has been a reluctance on the part of the parties concerned to summon the political will to make the necessary concessions. Hun Sen and his colleagues clearly believe that their survival depends upon isolating the Khmer Rouge as a military and political force. As former Khmer Rouge officials who know first-hand the duplicity and treachery to which Pol Pot will resort to achieve his goals, the PRK leaders wish to minimize the size of the arena in which the Khmer Rouge will be able to operate. They also know the political benefits that will flow to them if they can keep world attention focused on the horrors of Pol Pot's rule and the need to prevent its resurrection in the future.

Hun Sen has therefore insisted on the preservation of the PRK regime. He has been willing to include Sihanouk in a purely symbolic role-reigning but not ruling-because that would legitimate the PRK regime without forcing it to relinquish any power. But he is prepared to go his own way if the prince continues to reject cooperation.

Hun Sen's confidence was buoyed for a while by apparent cracks in the policy consensus in Thailand. Since late 1988, Prime Minister Chatchai Choonhavan has taken a much softer line on Cambodia than his predecessor and the Thai foreign ministry and army. Chatchai appeared willing to recognize the "reality" of the PRK regime once Vietnam withdrew, and favored turning the Indochina battlefield into a marketplace dominated by Bangkok. He toyed with the ideas of denying sanctuary on Thai soil to the three wings of the resistance and of choking off the supply of Chinese military assistance to them-actions that the PRK and Vietnam believe would cause the Khmer Rouge and the NCR to wither on the vine and guarantee Phnom Penh's ability to contain them. Chatchai's initiative took its most visible form in January 1989 when Hun Sen visited Bangkok at the prime minister's invitation. He has subsequently backed away from his proposals because he was unwilling to accept a break with China, which took a dim view of his move toward Hun Sen. Yet as long as the PRK believes that the Chatchai card might be played, and the Khmer Rouge rendered impotent as a result, its incentive for compromise tends to remain low.

Sihanouk's political constraint stems from his dependence on China. Always aware of Chinese influence, the prince in the last decade has had also to rely on Beijing for diplomatic and financial support and for material assistance to the NCR. In exchange for Chinese aid, Sihanouk has given China a veto, in effect, over his negotiating proposals. Although he knows the dangers posed by the Khmer Rouge-many members of the royal family met their end in the Killing Fields-Sihanouk has vigorously advocated a quadripartite interim government. In public defense of that proposal he asserts that it would be easier to "keep an eye on" and control the Khmer Rouge if it were included in an interim regime than if it remained in the jungle. In his franker moments, he admits that his hands are tied with a Chinese knot.

For this reason Sihanouk has been reluctant to consider what would be a morally more acceptable alignment: a tripartite coalition arrangement in which he and Son Sann would join with the PRK against the Khmer Rouge. By joining Hun Sen, Sihanouk would burn his bridges to China without any advance guarantee of a new patron in order to provide the role of front man for the pro-Vietnam wing of the Cambodian communist movement, just as he has in the past given respectability to the Khmer Rouge. In any event, it appears that although Hun Sen has offered Sihanouk the position of chief of state in his regime and posts for some of his followers, he has not proposed a genuine power-sharing arrangement.5

In November, in the wake of the failure of the Cambodian factions to resolve their differences at the Paris conference, Australian Foreign Minister Evans proposed establishing a U.N.-supervised interim administration as a way of removing the key obstacle to a political settlement and bringing the conflict to an end. His proposal emphasizes the following elements of a comprehensive settlement:

-a U.N. peacekeeping force that would be responsible for implementing a ceasefire in cantonments, disarming the forces, destroying military stockpiles and monitoring the ceasefire;

-internationally supervised elections to select a constituent assembly;

-an internationally supervised end to external sanctuaries and external assistance for military purposes to all parties;

-a massive international program of relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction in Cambodia;

-permitting civilians in all camps associated with the resistance factions to have freedom of movement to return to their place of origin or to accompany their faction back into Cambodia.

In order to break the logjam on interim political arrangements, the Evans initiative would have the United Nations play a significant role in governing Cambodia between the time an agreement is reached and the emergence of a new Cambodian government. An enhanced U.N. role that would supervise an interim Cambodian administration creatively circumvents Hun Sen's objection to the inclusion of the Khmer Rouge in a coalition government and the CGDK's objection to recognizing the PRK regime as the basis for a settlement.

The U.N. secretary general, with the agreement of all parties concerned, would appoint a special representative to serve as head of an interim authority. He and the international civil servants he brings with him would supervise the existing bureaucracy, although the depth of U.N. involvement is still a matter for negotiations. The four factions would continue to exist at least as political parties (but not as coalition partners in an interim government). Whether the PRK and the CGDK would cease to exist as legal entities is as yet unresolved.6

The initial positive responses from most of the parties, including Vietnam and the PRK, were somewhat encouraging. The main point of contention is how the concept will be fleshed out. China still prefers the quadripartite interim proposal, but if that approach is not acceptable it is prepared to support "in principle" a supervisory role for the United Nations. Only the Khmer Rouge has displayed some public resistance.

More disquieting have been the results of initial soundings concerning the U.N. role in administering Cambodia during the interim period. Understandably, Hun Sen has asked for a minimum of U.N. interference in the running of the country. The Chinese, on the other hand, have argued for a root-and-branch removal of PRK officials. In effect, the disagreement over power-sharing that derailed the 1989 Paris conference has been transposed into the U.N. frame of reference. Yet because the concept of U.N. supervision of the interim administration is designed to circumvent the stalemate over power-sharing, negotiations will run aground unless the four factions and their partners can reach a compromise on this central issue.

The U.N.-based settlement should have a better chance of being accepted than previously rejected proposals because it would give something to everyone and requires capitulation by no one. For the NCR, such an agreement would put an end to the fighting in Cambodia, provide for the presence of an international peacekeeping force and avoid a legitimation of the PRK. It would also give them the opportunity through free and fair elections to shape Cambodia's political future, and thus reduce the political advantage that Hun Sen might otherwise gain from control of the administrative apparatus.

A U.N. agreement on Cambodia would also enable China and the ASEAN countries to verify the Vietnamese withdrawal and deny Hanoi the victory of international acceptance for the PRK regime. China would then be able to tell the Khmer Rouge that it is on a par with the other parties. Furthermore, by facilitating a settlement, Beijing could reduce some of the international notoriety it earned in the Tienanmen massacre.

Although the Khmer Rouge would gain the dissolution of the PRK regime, it is less inclined to go along with a U.N. formula than the other factions because its prospects for seizing power would clearly diminish. Yet Beijing is the key: if China supports the formula, the Khmer Rouge would probably be compelled to go along, given its dependence on China. The prospects for a settlement therefore depend, among other things, on China's willingness and ability to deliver the Khmer Rouge.7

For the PRK, it would secure an end to the fighting, a cessation of Chinese support for Pol Pot, the exclusion of the Khmer Rouge from the interim administration, an opportunity to do well in the elections, increased foreign assistance, enhanced international legitimacy, and perhaps a share of the Cambodian seat at the United Nations.

For Vietnam, a U.N. agreement would provide the opportunity for Hanoi's leaders to end their international isolation and provide their protégé, Hun Sen, with the possibility of a significant political role in the new government. An accord would also reduce the chances that Vietnamese troops would have to return to Cambodia to prevent a Khmer Rouge victory.

An agreement would allow the Soviet Union to end its involvement in another regional conflict-certainly more cleanly than was the case in Afghanistan-and gain the benefit of a further reduction in East-West tension. Moreover, a U.N. solution would be consistent with the growing emphasis in Soviet foreign policy on using the United Nations as the mechanism for resolving regional disputes. The United States would also achieve its policy objectives-an act of self-determination for the Cambodian people and some certainty that the Khmer Rouge will not return to power.

Whether the United Nations should shoulder the burden that Foreign Minister Evans has suggested, and whether the governments and taxpayers of wealthy countries are willing to pay the price, reflects the more basic problem of political will. Without a willingness on behalf of all parties to the Cambodian conflict to take risks for the sake of the Khmer people, no settlement will ever be possible. It is the task of diplomacy to determine whether a compromise can be reached, and given the consequences should negotiations fail, it is important to make the effort.

Will the Cambodian factions accept a U.N.-supervised interim administration? If China supports the Evans formula, or does not actively oppose it, Sihanouk will probably jump at the chance to appear more independent.8 More problematic are the motives of the two communist factions. If neither is truly willing, despite its public statements, to run the risk of a contest for power through internationally supervised elections, then there will never be a political settlement. If Hun Sen in fact is able to contain his adversaries close to the Thai-Cambodian border, then he will probably expect the international community to confer legitimacy on him. If the Khmer Rouge believes that, even without Chinese support, it can seize power through armed struggle at an acceptable cost, it will probably not be willing to subject itself to the popular will.

Between these two scenarios, however, may exist a zone of opportunity in which the risks of a continuing struggle outweigh those of a political settlement that seeks to demilitarize the conflict, particularly if external backers choose to cut their losses. In that zone of opportunity lies the proposal for a U.N.-supervised interim administration. Hun Sen and Pol Pot should be put to the test.

V

During the ten years that Vietnam occupied Cambodia, the United States, haunted by its Indochina nightmare, tended to follow the lead of China and the ASEAN countries. Washington took a back seat in defining the shape of a political settlement, and was reluctant to provide assistance for the noncommunist resistance. When the United States decided to provide aid, it was only of a non-lethal character and was given on the condition that it not enhance, directly or indirectly, the fighting capacity of the Khmer Rouge. There have been U.S. proposals to provide lethal aid for the forces of Sihanouk and Son Sann, but the requisite political consensus has been lacking and no such aid has been provided.9

Although Washington had no role in developing Sihanouk's quadripartite formula, the United States became associated with it. At the same time, the Bush administration was unable to dispel the serious concerns that such an agreement would provide Pol Pot with his best chance of returning to power, and that Sihanouk appeared to be acting less and less as a symbol of Cambodian nationalism and more and more like a front man for China and the Khmer Rouge. Whether these concerns were well founded or not, their existence made it difficult to build a broad and sustainable consensus for U.S. policy.

The current U.S. objectives in Cambodia are to secure a verified withdrawal of Vietnamese forces, bring an end to the fighting, prevent the Khmer Rouge from returning to power, and encourage Cambodian self-determination. In pursuit of those goals and in the wake of the positive response to Foreign Minister Evans' initiative regarding interim political arrangements, the United States has undertaken to build consensus among the permanent members of the Security Council on all the elements of a U.N.-based comprehensive settlement. The first stage of this process occurred in mid-January 1990 in Paris, when officials at the level of assistant secretary exchanged views on a peacekeeping force, elections, costs and so on. The result was a "summary of conclusions" that expressed agreement on "an enhanced U.N. role in the resolution of the Cambodian problem," and consensus on most of the elements of a settlement.

On the critical point of a U.N.-supervised interim administration not even a vague public agreement was achieved, but that is not surprising given the preliminary stage of the discussions. Presumably, U.S. officials will attempt to forge consensus around some variant of the Evans initiative, in part because they know that it is probably the only idea left for cutting the Gordian knot of power-sharing.

In addition to playing the important role of building a great-power agreement, Washington should also undertake several bilateral initiatives. It should urge Moscow to cease military aid to the Hun Sen regime, and encourage Bangkok to inhibit Khmer Rouge activities and secure greater freedom for the civilians under Khmer Rouge control. To make the proposal as attractive as possible to Vietnam, the United States should be prepared to offer full normalization of relations, including the establishment of a diplomatic mission in Hanoi, and the elimination of the embargo on trade and investment. Given Vietnam's economic crisis and Hanoi's desire to break out of its isolation, a U.S. offer to open a new chapter in the relations between the two countries should be a powerful incentive for Vietnam to cooperate in the search for a Cambodian settlement.10

Because China has been the sole supporter of the Khmer Rouge, and because the Khmer Rouge will probably not agree to a reasonable settlement without Chinese pressure, Washington should:

-inform Beijing of the importance it attaches to China's role in this issue;

-explicitly reject the quadripartite formula, which the United States previously had quietly endorsed and which China continues to support, in order to make clear to Beijing that there can be no fallback from the U.N. formula;

-call on Beijing to immediately end its support for the Khmer Rouge;

-promise an improvement in U.S.-China relations if Beijing gets the Khmer Rouge to agree to a settlement.

Securing genuine Chinese endorsement of a U.N.-based settlement for Cambodia would be one way for the administration to prove that the dispatch to China of National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and Undersecretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger in July and December 1989 was justified.

The Chinese have indicated that they do not want the Khmer Rouge to return to exclusive power, and that if Pol Pot rejected a reasonable settlement, China would end its assistance to the Khmer Rouge. If Khmer Rouge intransigence results in a breakdown of negotiations, therefore, it will still result in a cutting of the Chinese lifeline, the probable emergence of a coalition of Cambodian factions opposed to Pol Pot, and the end of Thai sanctuary for the Khmer Rouge, thus greatly reducing the threat it poses. At best, the U.N. approach will produce a negotiated settlement that puts the Khmer Rouge in a political box. At a minimum, it could serve to place the Khmer Rouge in isolation-which is precisely where it belongs.

Others have argued that because a settlement is highly unlikely, the United States should recognize the PRK regime as the strongest bulwark against the Khmer Rouge and even provide it with assistance. If a political settlement on any terms is impossible, the international community may confront a choice between supporting the PRK or watching the Khmer Rouge return to power. Indeed, if the Evans-U.N. formula fails, Western governments such as Britain and France may well be forced to yield to the pressure of anti-Khmer Rouge public opinion and begin opening embassies in Phnom Penh. They will surely be unwilling to continue voting at the United Nations to give the Cambodian seat to the Khmer Rouge and its noncommunist partners in the CGDK.

Choosing between the PRK and the Khmer Rouge would present the United States with a Hobson's choice. Support for the Khmer Rouge would be, of course, utterly unthinkable. Yet backing Hun Sen is hardly an enticing proposition. In the first place, the PRK may prove to be quite weak, even with U.S. support, when confronted by the full force of the Khmer Rouge. If the United States were to provide support to the PRK regime-whether political or military as well-it would probably not make much difference in stopping the Khmer Rouge.11

In any case, building political support for U.S. recognition of the PRK, even on anti-Khmer Rouge grounds, would not be easy. Hun Sen's party remains a Leninist party both organizationally and ideologically. The PRK's leaders are tainted, moreover, by a sordid past. Most of the members of the PRK politburo are former Khmer Rouge who were part of the killing machine established by Pol Pot. They defected to Vietnam not for reasons of principle but because they were about to be devoured themselves. Having ridden into Phnom Penh on Vietnamese tanks, they then engaged in human rights abuses that, according to Amnesty International, included the execution, incarceration and torture of thousands.

It is doubtful, therefore, that either the Bush administration or Congress would be willing to materially support the Hun Sen regime-even though, should the Australian initiative fail, U.S. support for the PRK would clearly be the lesser of two evils.

The only way to avoid the difficult choice between the Khmer Rouge and PRK and the best way to achieve U.S. objectives-the most important of which is to prevent the Khmer Rouge from returning to power-is to secure a sound political settlement in Cambodia. If Washington were to recognize the regime in Phnom Penh before the search for a political settlement was exhausted, Hun Sen would inevitably conclude that time was on his side and he would undoubtedly be less willing to make the kind of concessions necessary for an agreement. Furthermore, siding now with the PRK, thereby greatly reducing the prospects for a comprehensive settlement, would rule out the other major objectives of American policy-true independence for Cambodia and self-determination of the Cambodian people.

Prior to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December 1978, no country lifted a finger to stop the slaughter by the Khmer Rouge of innocent people. While a powerful moral argument might be made for an international police action to prevent a Khmer Rouge return to power again, the prospects for such an initiative in 1990 are as slim as they were in 1975. Regrettably, there are limits to what people of goodwill can do to stop inhumanity and injustice.

Yet the impossibility of stopping some abuses in the past is no justification for doing nothing when new disasters loom in the future. If the international community truly believes that humane treatment of the defenseless is a norm that should be applied wherever possible, it must act now and to the utter limits of its capacity to block a new round of genocide in Cambodia. Even if chronic civil war is the ultimate outcome in that country, it is not an acceptable one as long as a satisfactory political settlement remains possible. Cambodians have suffered too long because of the moral cynicism of others. We degrade our own values if we unnecessarily permit them to suffer any longer.

1 In late February, news reports indicated that Vietnam sent elite combat units back into Cambodia at the end of October 1989. This both restores the Vietnamese presence to the agenda of issues to be addressed in a political settlement and indicates the fragility of the PRK hold on the country.

2 This pattern began in the fifteenth century, with the Vietnamese and Thai courts trying to control Cambodia or at least bar the other's influence. The most common scenario before the arrival of French colonialism was for factions in the Khmer court to seek the aid of Hanoi or Bangkok, each of which was all too willing to use the conflict to wrest control of zones of Cambodian territory and otherwise protect their interests.

3 In a conversation in 1981, Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach told me that Vietnam's motivation for intervening was not to protect the human rights of the Cambodian people, which Hanoi regarded as Cambodia's internal affair, but to bring an end to a series of destructive cross-border raids by the Khmer Rouge. He said nothing about Vietnam's historical ambition to establish an Indochinese federation under its control, which presumably was one of Hanoi's motives as well.

4 This was not the first time that Prince Sihanouk entered into an alliance with the Khmer Rouge. After his fall in 1970, he lent support to Pol Pot's cause. Khmer Rouge cadres carried his picture as a kind of revolutionary icon. Far more than the American bombing, the willingness of Prince Sihanouk to let the Khmer Rouge recruit and mobilize in his name was a key factor in its ultimate triumph. It was a mistake of disastrous proportions for which the prince has never forgiven himself.

5 Sihanouk's objections aside, a tripartite arrangement has other problems. It would neither stop the fighting nor guarantee an end to Chinese assistance. Furthermore, any type of international presence under United Nations auspices would be impossible, since the United Nations only enters situations where all parties agree, and China would certainly veto a U.N. role under such an agreement.

6 Cambodia's seat at the United Nations, now under the exclusive control of the CGDK, would either be declared vacant or filled in a way acceptable to each of the factions, thereby giving Hun Sen, who has criticized the United Nations for being biased in the past, some assurance that it would be more objective in the future.

7 Some have objected to the Australian initiative because it would give the Khmer Rouge the right to participate in elections. Yet if there is to be a settlement that ends the fighting and permits an act of self-determination by the Cambodian people, the Khmer Rouge leaders will have to be included as participants, albeit in a way that reduces the risks that they could undermine the settlement. If they cannot even participate in the elections-which they are sure to lose-they and their Chinese patrons will never agree to a settlement in the first place and the fighting will continue.

8 Prince Sihanouk's latest resignation, in January 1990, appears designed to distance himself from the Khmer Rouge now that a political settlement seems to be in the cards. Realistically speaking, however, he will probably preserve the possibility of a return to the Chinese-Khmer Rouge fold in case the U.N. formula does not result in a settlement, particularly if Beijing is the only certain source of weapons for his troops.

9 Although it is conceivable that minimal amounts of assistance intended for the NCR have ended up in Khmer Rouge hands, such "leakage" is insignificant, since the total amount of aid reaching the NCR is a fraction of what the Khmer Rouge receives from China.

10 It would be a mistake to establish diplomatic relations and lift the embargo before the outcome of this round of negotiations is clear. If we were to do so, it would significantly diminish Hanoi's incentive to exercise leverage on Hun Sen in order to facilitate a settlement. Once a settlement is achieved, we should move swiftly to normalize relations between the United States and Vietnam.

11 The failure of the Lon Nol regime to defeat the Khmer Rouge after receiving over $1 billion in U.S. military aid from 1970 to 1975 suggests that American backing alone hardly constitutes an adequate basis for preventing the return of the Khmer Rouge. Then, as now, Pol Pot's opponents did not lack for military equipment. Now, as then, the deficiency lies in the areas of leadership, morale, training and so on.

The Future of Cambodia

The Future of Cambodia

Prince Norodom Sihanouk

October 1970

Neither Lon Nol nor President Nixon has left Cambodians any alternative to armed struggle and revolution-a struggle and revolution whose object is to enable our people to regain their freedom, our nation to recover its dignity and our country to become independent again.

Before taking up the fundamental questions regarding my country which are of especial interest for Americans, I would like to cite some significant American statements about "the Cambodian tragedy."

In an address to the U.S. Senate on "the Cambodian tragedy" on April 16, 1970, Senator Mike Mansfield said: "What was for a decade and a half the only oasis of peace in Indochina has been turned into a bloody battlefield in the space of one month. . . . The conflict already involves the potential of an ugly genocide by government-stimulated mob action against the several hundred-thousand Vietnamese civilians-for the most part farmers, fishermen and tradesmen-who come from both North and South Vietnam and who have lived for decades in reasonable peace in Cambodia. In short, the Pandora's box which was held shut by the leadership and diplomacy of Prince Sihanouk is now wide open. For years Cambodia was in the eye of the Indochinese hurricane; now it is swept up in the full fury of a racial, ideological and militarist storm. . . . We do know, or ought to know on the basis of experience that even with a massive infusion of American equipment we are likely to have minimal constructive effect on that upheaval and we will open the door to another destructive impact on our own national interests."

Like an echo to Senator Mansfield's warning, The New York Times, in an editorial the next day, wrote: "Evidence of government-inspired mass murder of Vietnamese civilians living in Cambodia should provoke second thoughts in Washington about the stability as well as the morality of the régime that recently displaced Prince Sihanouk in Phnompenh. Evidence of appeals to the ancient prejudices of the Khmers against a neighboring people is a sign of desperation on the part of a government trying to shore up a shaky political base."

Thirteen days after the publication of this editorial President Nixon ordered United States armed forces stationed in South Vietnam to invade Cambodia, and permitted the armed forces of the Saigon Generals Thieu and Ky to accompany them in order, he said, to wipe out the "Vietcong sanctuaries" there.

In appraising that invasion, Senator William Fulbright declared, on May 28, 1970: "The administration now apparently intends to sustain an indefinite full-scale military intervention by proxy in Cambodia. ... It is equally clear that the purpose of this proxy military campaign is not merely to eliminate communist border sanctuaries . . . but to sustain the feeble Lon Nol military régime in Phnompenh."

The "communist sanctuaries" in fact occupied an infinitesimal part of Cambodia before Mr. Nixon's invasion, occupied a third of the country in the course of the invasion and occupy up to two-thirds of the country in the wake of the withdrawal of the U.S. troops (not accompanied, however, by the withdrawal of the South Vietnamese troops of Thieu and Ky).

II

Neither Lon Nol nor President Nixon, who decided to support him in order to keep his dictatorial régime in power at all costs, wants Cambodia to return to independence, neutrality, territorial integrity and democracy. I am sorry to have to say it, but I must: the United States does not think of "independence" and "democracy" for its satellite countries in the same way it thinks of independence and democracy for itself.

At Phnompenh, the Lon Nol group illegally deposed me for "betrayal of democracy." Without the sanction of any constitutional provision whatever, the Phnompenh parliament, in complicity with Lon Nol, set itself up as a "people's tribunal" to judge me, while preventing me, at the same time, from returning to Cambodia and answering the various accusations that the parliament made. According to our constitutional laws, the humblest citizen has the right to defend himself in court, and the Cambodian state has no right to exile Khmer citizens. As far as the Chief of State is concerned, the Constitution even specifies that "his person is sacred and inviolable,"

Immediately following my deposition there were peaceful demonstrations in my favor almost everywhere in the country. Lon Nol savagely put down the demonstrators by force of arms; his soldiers and even his tanks massacred them pitilessly by the hundreds.

In this connection I can cite the following testimony of American and British correspondents:

T. Jeff Williams (Associated Press [AP], March 30) : "Firsthand evidence gathered in Cambodia's provinces by the Associated Press shows that it is organized Sihanouk supporters who are ready to march on the capital, not Vietcong troops. . . . This has brought the army into confrontation with the Cambodian people in several instances and many Cambodians have been killed."

Anton Wills-Eve (Reuters, April 1) : "Witnesses said that government troops met the rebels with a hail of machine gun fire, cutting down everyone in sight and leaving many dead on the road as an example to others not to rise up in support of Prince Sihanouk. An eye witness described the rebels as peasants. . . ."

T. Jeff Williams (AP, April 3) : "... Another violent demonstration . . . erupted. . . . The population staged a demonstration in favor of Sihanouk. Army troops . . . opened fire on the marchers, killing thirty by the official count. ... In addition, the government is rounding up thousands of persons suspected of being . . . pro-Sihanouk. . . . Navy gunboats are anchored in mid-stream to guard against mass crossings by demonstrators attempting to reach Phnompenh. ... A question often raised by observers here is why the government is permitting its troops to shoot its own people. . . ."

This testimony requires no comment, but my readers will also want to know the fate of the citizens arrested by the hundreds by the Lon Nol régime after the demonstrations described above. I therefore present the testimony of Jacques Doyon, of the French conservative newspaper Le Figaro (April 20, 1970) :

"It will be recalled that the 'pro-Sihanouk' demonstrators who came from Kompong Cham on the 26th and 27th of March arrived in the thousands at the gates of Phnompenh and were dispersed by rifle fire. ... A number of people fled from the rain of bullets, in particular along the Mekong. They took refuge in Vietnamese villages, and the manhunt was on.

"It will be remembered that, as we have written, a good many of them, probably several hundred. . . . were imprisoned until April 10. Commencing on that day, according to the inhabitants of the area, river transport boats came to take on the prisoners. ... To lighten the transports, the demonstrators were thrown into the water after being executed; some of them had their hands tied behind their backs."

It is facts like these which account for the creation of the National United Front of the Kampuchea, which brings together all the anti-fascist Cambodians-the non-communists whom the press calls "Sihanoukists" and the communists known as "Red Khmers."

III

Without waiting for the end of hostilities, Washington diplomacy has been very active in creating a "Phnompenh-Saigon-Bangkok-Vientiane Axis." Indeed, the Western press has been speaking of it quite openly of late.

It is an "axis," or, if you will, a "de facto federation"-the obvious objective of which is to keep the countries of the region in the "American camp" and to prevent their peoples from embracing communism or socialism. But the real question is whether such a "federation" can implant itself in the hearts and minds of the peoples concerned or whether it will not always remain an artificial creation of the United States, maintained by it, "at arm's length," by dint of dollars, artillery and bombs, as is the case of Cambodia at the moment.

The American people's ideals of freedom, democracy and independence are certainly worthy of respect. But is the Nixon government sure of defending these ideals in defending the régimes of Lon Nol and his kind in Indochina and in Southeast Asia in general?

The United States has valid reasons, certainly, for defending itself against the propagation of communism in Asia and most particularly in Southeast Asia, if one looks at it from the standpoint of the highest interest of the American nation alone, of its influence and its strategic position in the world. But it would be pure hypocrisy to assert that the United States is defending the highest interests of the Indochinese peoples in preventing at all costs régimes like those of Lon Nol and of Nguyen Cao Ky from falling to communism, using for that purpose bombs and napalm, and an apocalyptic destruction of the countries and peoples concerned.

I am not and will not become a communist, for I disavow nothing of my religious beliefs or of my nationalism. But I know the Khmer people, the Vietnamese people and the other peoples of our region too well to believe that they can accept having the interests of reactionary, fascist, militarist and corrupt leaders imposed on them or accept having a great white power insist that for their own sakes they should take dictatorship in place of democracy and the satellization of their country in place of national independence.

In the eyes of rich bourgeois and feudalists, communism must seem terrifying. But in the eyes of peoples who are continually exploited by these bourgeois, these feudalists and these dictatorships which owe their strength solely to American protection, communism can only be, now and in the future, a deliverance. A deliverance, yes-because the problems of social injustice, of corruption, of militarist or bourgeois dictatorship, and of national independence, too (see the examples of China, North Vietnam and North Korea, which are incontestably independent), are being or will be solved thereby.

This is why the longer the United States insists on maintaining unpopular and pro-imperialist régimes in our countries, the more it will draw upon itself the hatred of our peoples and will, in consequence, build up both their revolutionary movements and their fighting solidarity.

In the face of the pro-United States "Phnompenh-Saigon-Bangkok-Vientiane Axis" there was formed, in April 1970, the "Axis" of the revolutionary peoples of Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, China and North Korea. The pro-United States axis will vanish the moment the Washington government stops supporting it with dollars, guns and bombs. But the common anti-imperialist front of the Khmer, Vietnamese, Laotian, Chinese and Korean peoples will survive it whatever happens, for even atom bombs will not be able to halt the revolution of the Asian peoples.

IV

How, one might ask, would I expect the traditional enmity between Khmers, Vietnamese and Thais might be overcome in order to make such a federation possible?

Has not the Lon Nol régime, that new American ally, made a "brilliant demonstration" of the possibility-necessity being the first law-of reconciling, bringing together and "federating" his Cambodians with the Vietnamese of Thieu and Ky and the Thais of Kittikachorn and Charusathien? In spite of the exceedingly painful memory of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, were not the Japanese, too, able to reconcile themselves and ally themselves to the Americans, their "mortal enemies" of yesterday? And was it not the same with the French and the Germans? Then why should not the Cambodians, the Vietnamese and the Thais be capable of surmounting their long-standing mutual "repulsion"?

Notwithstanding the very recent genocide of Vietnamese in Cambodia, has not the pro-U.S. Phnompenh régime "carried off" brilliantly a "marriage of convenience" with the pro-U.S. Saigon régime? As the magazine Newsweek concluded in its July 13, 1970, issue. "Like most marriages of convenience ... the alliance offered undeniable benefits to both sides."

To the "Sihanoukist" Khmers, the coup d'état perpetrated against me and against the policy of mine which Senator Mike Mansfield was kind enough to praise, as well as the intervention by the United States and its allies in favor of the fascist Phnompenh régime and its policy of abdicating national independence, left no alternative, on the national level, but to reconcile themselves to and make common cause with the "Red Khmers," and, on the international level, to ally themselves in a "common front" with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the revolutionary government and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam and the Lao Patriotic Front.

It is understood that after victory (which may be some time in coming, but which will inevitably be ours in the long run) each of our three peoples will be free to map out its own political and ideological line of conduct. On this subject, the "Joint Declaration from the Summit Conference of Indochinese Peoples" of April 25 is unequivocal:

The parties affirm their determination to safeguard and develop the fraternal friendship and good-neighborly relations among the three countries so as to give mutual support in the struggle against the common enemy and to coöperate in the future and on a long-term basis in the building of each country following the road which it finds appropriate. In the relations among the three countries, the parties are determined to apply the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; nonaggression; mutual respect for each other's political régime and noninterference in internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; peaceful coexistence.

Certain Western circles seem to be banking on racial antagonism between the Khmers and their neighbors to make it impossible for them to get together, so that they will thus always remain weak and will consequently feel the need to have themselves protected by a Western imperialist power.

Now, President Nixon's policy of armed intervention in Cambodia, his "Vietnamization" and "Asianization," has had the effect of throwing, on the one hand, the fascist, pro-imperialist Khmers into the arms of the anti- communist Vietnamese, and, on the other hand, Khmer progressives and peasants into the arms of the Vietnamese socialists. It is with good reason that Newsweek calls this new phenomenon a umarriage of convenience."

But one should not exaggerate the extent and intensity of racial antagonism in the past between the Khmers and their neighbors. Senator Mansfield quite justly observed that before the "genocide by government-stimulated mob action against several hundred-thousand Vietnamese civilians," the two peoples of supposedly antagonistic races "lived for decades in reasonable peace in Cambodia." Now and in the future, the one problem that weighs and will weigh most heavily in the balance will be that of the behavior of each of the two Vietnamese "camps" with regard to the Khmer people. Our people will be "with" or "against" the Vietnamese in so far as the latter are or are not "correct" toward them.

On this subject, I think my readers will be interested in the following reports from American correspondents.

Robert C. Miller (UPI, Phnompenh, July 5) : "The confused Cambodian civilians are being raped, robbed and hit over the head by their South Vietnamese allies. . . . The misbehavior of some of the 25,000 South Vietnamese marines, soldiers and sailors in Cambodia poses a new-and, many Cambodians believe, the most dangerous-threat to the Lon Nol government.... On the contrary, every Vietcong and North Vietnamese trooper is a walking ambassador of goodwill to the Cambodian noncombatants. They are following to the letter the same rigid policy laid down in China by Mao, namely, 'be nice to the peasants, for they are your strongest allies.'"

As for the Cambodians in communist-controlled areas, the French magazine L'Express writes, in its issue of July 5, 1970, the following: "An exceptional witness . . . saw them: Richard Dudman [of the St. Louis Post- Dispatch} taken prisoner by the Vietcong in May, with two other American journalists, and released last week: 'In the hamlets, fists raised against the Americans. Everywhere, a spontaneous coöperation between the peasants and the Cambodian guerrillas, as well as the North Vietnamese or the Vietcong. . . . The common fear of the bombings and the irruption of war following the American and South Vietnamese intervention have cemented the tacit alliance between the people of the rice-paddies and the guerrillas.' "

V

Might some or all of the states of Indochina be neutralized after the war? This question was answered for Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos in the international agreements signed at Geneva in 1954 and 1962.

As far as Vietnam is concerned, it was specified in the agreements of 1954 that in 1956 the country would be reunified under a single government by means of general elections. President Ho Chi Minh, whom the whole Vietnamese people, communist and non-communist, considered their national hero (for he was the true liberator of his homeland from French colonialism), would have won these general elections handily if they had taken place. But the United States, citing as a pretext an (imaginary) "invasion by North Vietnam," intervened in force in South Vietnam to prevent the aforementioned elections from taking place, to perpetuate the division of Vietnam and to keep South Vietnam in the camp of the "free" world-that is to say, the American world.

According to the Geneva Agreements of 1954, South Vietnam was to be neutralized only between July 1954 and July 1956. After July 1956, it was to be reunited with North Vietnam and form a single state under a single government-communist if Ho Chi Minh won (and his triumph was beyond doubt), non-communist if the neutralists and anti-communists won. Knowing that if the Geneva Agreements were applied in both their letter and their spirit South Vietnam would be lost to the "free" world, the United States decided, in 1955, to violate them. This led to the "Vietnam War" yesterday and is leading to the "Indochina War" today.

As for Laos and Cambodia, I can attest that the more the United States steps up its armed interventions or those of its allies in these two countries, the less chance there will be of their being "neutral" or "neutralized" in the future. And the more the United States and its allies support the régime of Lon Nol and prevent the National United Front of Cambodia from unseating it, the more they will push this Front arid, in consequence, the Khmer people and the Cambodia of tomorrow into the Asian socialist camp (which now includes the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the People's Republic of China and the People's Democratic Republic of Korea).

Sihanouk's fall in Cambodia will not have had the same consequences for the United States and its "camp" as Sukarno's fall had in Indonesia, for it must riot be forgotten that Cambodia is not an island far removed from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the People's Republic of China: my country is their next-door neighbor.

VI

Even if the states of Indochina accepted communist ideology, would this necessarily involve accepting Chinese predominance?

China is certainly a very great power, in relation to which our three Indochinese countries seem miniscule. But having twice visited the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, I can say that that Vietnamese country is very independent with regard to China as well as to the Soviet Union. The political or physical presence of China there is almost imperceptible and in no way comparable to the American presence in Cambodia since March 18, 1970.

In Laos, China does not exert a perceptible influence, and its material and financial assistance to the Lao Patriotic Front does not call for any quid pro quo, political or other.

My country is separated from China by Laos and Vietnam. And the Chinese leaders have often explained to me that their country would have nothing to gain from making a satellite of Cambodia-quite the contrary.

By respecting Cambodia's sovereignty and making it a "showcase" or "demonstration" of its respect for the principles of peaceful coexistence, China undoubtedly has more to gain in relation to the world and, in particular, the third world.

This said, it would be difficult indeed to prevent the Indochinese peoples from becoming "Maoists," that is to say, fighting to gain power for the people and sweep their countries clean of the gross capitalist feudalism and foreign imperialism which, coming from the West, opposes this power of the people by buying consciences and by arms.

In writing this, I am not, for all that, communisant, a fellow traveler.

If I am fighting in the camp of the Indochinese and Asian revolutionaries, it is because, on a personal level, I want to see justice done me some day after having been odiously calumniated and dishonored by the Lon Nol group; and because, on the national level, I must fulfill my duty as a patriot, a Khmer-and an Asian.

With Lon Nol and the armed intervention of the foreign powers that support him, my homeland and my people have lost everything-peace, dignity, independence, territorial integrity-and are immersed in the worst sufferings, the worst misfortunes and the worst catastrophe of their history.

In these circumstances I can only hope for the total victory of the revolution, in which I shall certainly not have my place but which cannot but save my homeland and serve the deepest interests of the mass of the "little" Khmer people.

As for the future relations of that people with the United States, they will once again become good as soon as Washington stops confusing the Lon Nol group with the Khmer nation and consequently stops helping it-directly or indirectly-to crush popular resistance.

This resistance cannot be crushed. If they are clearly understood, the long- term interests of the United States ought to impel its government to respect this resistance instead of treating it as hostile.

Who Is Khom? and Who is Khmer?

Is anybody know who is "Khom"? Who are they? and Where do they live? Can anybody tell me? Sometimes ago I felt really embarrassed that I did not know, at that time, who is "KHOM" and what are they?. But don't you wanna know why I felt like that? and what it has to do with me personally? Before I answer to that question above, here below are what is in Thailand history refer to as KhomThese couple pieces of papers are quoted from Thailand history books, even though I have not yet find the first hand source, which showing what is "KHORM" alphabets are, in which Siamese refer to. The point is in Thai history, they belief that their scripts were derived from Khom nation, and the worst is "KHOM" is not Cambodia.

Leg go back to my question above. The reason I personally felt embrassed because as what I am Cambodian or Khmer, and I do not know that there is such as word of "Khom" in Khmer history. Especially, Khom is ancient Khmer as what the Thais refers too.

There is nothing wrong with the ideas above, since in this 21st century most of the country promote human right and which freedom of expression is just one of those rights; however, given fall information is what most of us think that completely unacceptable. Thai government has all the right to think and to say as well as the Thai citizens but as long as it is not affecting the other nation or people. The ideas that Thais citizens believe that Khom is not Khmer, the ancient Khmer, is what Cambodia can not tolerate it since it affects to Cambodia history, nationality, origin, and reputation.

According to a Thai lawyer-professor named Sompong Sucharitkul spoke with ABC Radio Australia on Monday, August 04, 2008 that " the current generation of Kampucheans are not the same as the Khom the old Khmer that may have been successor in title but it's long far removed from their ancestry." It seems like Thailand has long been rewrite Cambodia history for their Thai generations, and this kind of belief seems has been deep roots to every single Thai citizen and children that about to learn their neighbor history as what the Thai lawyer above as a role national model.

To Cambodia, Thais action that mentioned early can be considered as deprivation of Khmer history and Khmer citizen as the whole. This kind of statement and belief can really provide a misinformation of Cambodia to the world community. Especially the statement above can be translatable that Cambodia is a liar nation since it has claim that they are the Khmer.

In reality, the Khmer is yet exterminated and there will be only one Khmer race in the world history. Even though the Khmer is no longer a big and powerful race in the region which their once were, they know that their have a very long history. The Khmer know that after gone through many up and down of wave history, their only boat is still floating and there are nor the second boat ever exist.

It maybe difficult to understand the Thai action regard to the Khmer history by the foreigners, but it can be well understand by the Khmer. It seems like there are some cultural, political, and historical reason get involve in this long attempts action. Thailand event though a stronger nation compare to Cambodia nowadays, was formed under the Khmer empire period and later on expanded itself stronger and became a powerful nation after the Khmer golden age set. After the falling of Angkor, the Siam start to absorb and simplifies of every Khmer civilization and culture and use it as it own such as language, scripts, and culture. However the Siam does not want anything to attached with the Khmer even though in reality they are, they have used every means to disregard the Khmer civilization and claim that as their. All of these reasons without understanding the Siam and Khmer history, foreigners will never understand of real action of Siam which is now refer as Thai.

There is proverb say "history is for the winner to write but the loser". There is nothing wrong with this proverb, but it is so wrong and an unethical mistake that one nation to write another nation's history. To Cambodia, by rewriting the Khmer history and creating a word "KHORM" instead of Khmer to put in their history education system for their children by the Thais reflects its long term political interest to blind the world of its own dirty actions and ignorance of it true origin and especially to undermind the Khmer history and origin.

By Rocky

The Arrogance Government

The Preah Vihear temple dispute between Thailand and Cambodia has been dragged for more than 6 months so far; however, the sun of the problem is not yet to set. To me, since the problem erupted in july 2008, as a Cambodian citizen, I feel like there is no dispute of fact to asking for as what the Thai have claim. Even though, I wasn't born long enough to witness the ICJ judgment when Thai returned the temple to Cambodia in 1962, but according to the same judgment, whether who ever read the judgment both young and old generation or westerner and easterner, the judgment says that "the temple of Preah Vihear was situated in territory under the sovereignty of Cambodia then that Thailand was under an obligation to withdraw any military or police forces from the temple and turn it back to Cambodia." Thank to ICJ that spelled out of every single word that relate to the temple really clear and understandable for the Thai to understand that that temple is not belong to them. As a result, Thailand withdrew its troops and returned all sculptures to the temple.

Is that the Preah Vihear temple issue finished? no not yet. Then what is the problem right now, and what are Thai people asking for? According to the incident that erupted in July 2008, this time it was not really about the temple anymore, but the surrounding areas of land about 4.5 square kilometers that Thailand insists that it belongs to them according to its unilateral map that drew alone by its side with American support. This claim is really disturb me a lot lately because every time I look at the map and the judgment, I do not see it as what the Thais see. For Thais, they claim that the judgment was settled only the Preah Vihear Temple but not the surrounding land. So let get to the point. According to the claim, who we are going to blame for? Should we blame the ICJ that did not spell it out every single object that exist on the map that their use for the judgment? Suppose to say that the ICJ did ruled it out clearly that the surrounding land is also belong to Cambodia, do they have to spell it out of forests, rocks, mountains, lakes, and etc... Or this is what a civilize country would do as what the Thais always claim of who their are.

In reality the judgment made clear enough to spell out the meaning of the current issue. Whoever read the judgment, whether westerner or Asian, but maybe not Thais, will see that the judgment is understandable that the surrounding areas is belong to Cambodia. I have attached the map below for the readers to read and do your own judgment. According to the map that was also used by the ICJ, how can you say that the temple is belong to Cambodia but not the surrounding area? Let me quote a phrase from the ICJ judgment again "the temple of Preah Vihear was situated in territory under the sovereignty of Cambodia". What the judgment said is the temple does locates in Cambodia territory. If the temple is in Cambodia territory, why not the surrounding areas?



It seems like the problem was not about the judgment but about the map. The main problem is there are two maps have been used between both sides. Thailand has constantly rejects of using the map that its signed with French, a Cambodian protector, in 1904 by its own government. It claims that the map is unusable because it was unfair for Thailand. To Thai government, the 1904 map was signed because Thailand was forced to do so by French and its army. In addition, the whole Thai nations was at stalk of becoming another French colony as what happened in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.

However, what all of those have to do with Cambodia? To me, I think that there is nothing has to do with Cambodia. Especially Thailand really should not use that reason to excuse to rise up the border problem with Cambodia but to respect its government decision because without that agreement, Thailand should had became as one of French Indochina country and its country future should have changed by now. Instead, after taking benefit from the agreement, it turns its back and rejects to recognize the agreement for now. What kind of a civilize nation is that? To me I think that, this kind of action is nothing but just only reflects its own ignorance and arrogant behavior and especially to damage it own reputation in the world community.

In conclusion, it should has not come to this point and the lives of two Thai soldiers should have been saved by their own government, if Thailand acts as a civilize nation in this 21st century. It an honor to die for the sake of their own nation but it seems like their die for the ignorance and arrogance behavior of their government instead.

By Rocky

Who is the right person?

My comment is about Cambodian politic. Since I am Cambodian, I just want to share some of my opinion to be heard by other Khmer citizens. So why I name my title as "Who is the right person?" what do i mean by that? Oh yes, it is simple. It is about Cambodia politic today and the future. However, I want to let you guys know that I am not a member of CPP nor other party yet. Even though I used to registered as a CPP member before, because I was young and did not pay much attention in politic. In other word, I had no ideas yet about politic. It was just peer pressure that why i did that. But now i know what is politic, and i start to like it from day to day. So sometime i come up with my opinion about politic.

Talk about my title above, what do i mean by that? yeah it is about who is the right person to head Cambodia to future. We are not just want to go forward but with success and development. To me, Cambodian politic has been divided into six separates periods. The first period i would name it as the golden age, which we all Cambodian know as "The Khmer Empire". The country was great. But past is past, and we need to move on. the second period is the dark age of the fall of Khmer Empire, during the helpless of Khmer society due to foreign intrusion and influence. The third period was The French protectorate, which the national life was relied on the hand of French protection. The fourth period was the Sangkom Reas Niyoum of King Norodom Sihanouk. The fifth period was The Year Zero of Khmer Rought, and finally the Kingdom of Cambodia period which is where we are right now. So through out our history, we mostly met negative politic than positive. The point was our politician and our ex leaders politic were mostly wrong. We did not do well enought for our great nation which she sould deserve better than this.

Now please take a close look through our history, everytime our country got peace and stability, Cambodia tend to do great. Look at our old empire and our Sangkom Reas Niyoum period, our country was doing great. Compare to nowadays, even though Mr, Hun Sen was whatever a puppet of Vietnam politic, but sometime it is good to have a strong man is heading the very young and weak nation like what we are right now. I am not support Hun Sen politic with some neighbours countries as what he has been doing, but I support him to bring peace, stablity, and development to Cambodia. Since 1993 Cambodia has started her way on a very brand new rough democracy way which she has never been before experienced with. Actually she did, but it was live long enought to count in. Until today, the fourth term of Cambodia democracy with the same guy Mr. Hun Sen. Some western politicians always mentions his name as a strong man. I think they are right. However, there is nothing wrong to be a strong man right. Finally, Cambodia economy start to working with its 10% plus growth since 2005 to today. So what is going to be next?

My point is I don't care who is the prime minister. But make sure that he is heading the country going forward. I am not talking about who is better than who and who politic is more effiency than who. But it is about is it working or not. We all know that democracy in this world is transforming everyday. The original democracy system was long gone tranformed. Maybe it only exist in the west. But it does not mean that all countries have to use exactly the same democracy system as American does. For Cambodia, with the long history of collectism than individualism, plus its very young and weak democracy structure in the goverment policy nowadays, pushing to hard may be end up in danger to democracy itself. With Mr. Hun Sen, who is holding absolute power from the top to the bottom, and from the left of horizontal of Cambodian territory to the right, violence strategies as Norodom Ranarith did in 1998 was not a good choice to be used. Instead, I support H.E Sam Rangsy non violence policy, even though sometime i feel so pitty about his actions and his policy, but i think he has done the best that he could so far for the sake of Cambodian people and Cambodia herself. Finally, who is leading the country is not a matter, but whether he is capable to run the country to right way or not does really matter to us. So may god bless Cambodia.

By Rocky